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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALLEN GLADE KALLAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16,619

MAGI OLSON KALLAS,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Appellant is appealing a conviction of civil
contempt which was entered for failure to obey a child
visitation order while said visitation order was pending
appeal.
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff-Appellant was found to be guilty of contempt
on September 20, 1979, by Judge George E. Ballif in the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order finding
him in contempt of court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff and defendant were divorced on September
15, 1977, with the custody of their three children being
awarded to the defendant.

(R.20) (Unless otherwise stated,

all record citations are to the record of the initial appeal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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from the visitation order, case number 16,481.). Approximately
one week after the decree was entered, the defendant told
the plaintiff that she didn't want custody of the children
any more and that he should come and get them.

(R.167)

The

Court awarded custody of the children to the plaintiff on
September 23, 1977, pursuant to a stipulation between the
parties.

This order allowed the defendant "reasonable

visitation rights."

(R.25)

In May of 1978, the defendant called the plaintiff and
in the course of their conversation informed plaintiff that
she was a lesbian, and was involved in the use of illegal
drugs.

(R.170)

Plaintiff later discovered that the defend-

ant was living in an apartment with her lesbian lover and a
' male homosexual, (R.116-117), and that she had propositioned
a young girl under the age of fourteen for the purpose of
.sex. (R.121-122,141-143)
On August 3, 1978, the plaintiff moved the lower court
for an Order to Show Cause to modify and restrict the
visitation rights of the defendant on the grounds that the
defendant was engaged in illegal use of drugs and was an
admitted lesbian.

On January 16, 1979, the defendant also

petitioned the lower court for an order setting forth her
visitation rights.

( R. 48)

The matter was tried on February 20, 1979.

At trial,

the court refused to hear much of the evidence offered by
plaintiff which tended to prove the extent of the defendant's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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homosexual activities, (R.147-148), her involvement with
illegal drugs, (R.126); and the danger such practices may be
to defendant's visiting children.

(R.157)

On April 19,

1979, the court granted to the defendant overnight
visitation rights on the first and third weekends of each
month.

The defendant was also awarded attorney's fees •.

( R. 71)

The plaintiff appealed the visitation order to this
court and that appeal is currently pending (case number
16,481).

The plaintiff refused to allow any visits under

the order and requested that the trial court stay execution
on the order while the appeal was pending.

In an order

dated May 15, 1979, the court granted the stay of execution
in regards to the money judgment for the attorney's fees but
refused to stay execution of the visitation portion.

The

.court approved a supersedeas bond in the amount of $1,500.00.
It also found plaintiff in contempt of court for failure to
allow visitation.

No penalty was invoked on the condition

that plaintiff henceforth comply with the order.

Plaintiff.

however, continued to fear for the welfare of the children
The defendant again sought to have the plaintiff held
in contempt for allegedly refusing to allow visitation and
an evidentiary hearing regarding the contempt charge was
conducted on July 27, 1979, before the Honorable Judge Allen
B. Sorensen in Division II.

The plaintiff, defendant and

several others testified at this hearing and afterwards
Judge Sorensen made numerous findings of fact.

(R.42-43,
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Case No. 16619)

However, no conclusions of law were reached

and the Judge made no decision regarding the guilt or innocence
of the plaintiff.

Judge Sorensen apparently felt that it

would be inappropriate for him to decide the contempt charge
so he forwarded his findings of fact to Judge Ballif in
Division III for the rendering of the decision.
No. 16619)

(R.4,Ccase

Judge Ballif found the plaintiff guilty on

September 20, 1979, based solely on the findings of fact of
Judge Sorensen and fined the plaintiff $300.00, twenty days
in jail suspended and $300.00 in attorney's fees.
.Case No. 16619)

(R.8-11,

It is this judgment from which plaintiff is

appealing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONTEMPT CITATION WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE
THE VISITATION ORDER WAS STAYED PENDING
THE APPEAL.
A.
~xecution

The Supersedeas Bond Filed By the Plaintiff Stayed
of the Visitation Order.

The plaintiff posted a

Supersedeas Bond in the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($1,500.00) when he initiated his appeal of the
visitation order.

This supersedeas bond was approved by the

trial court on May 15, 1979.

Having met these requirements,

plaintiff is entitled to a stay of execution pursuant to
Rule 62(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
Stay on.Appeai. When an appeal is
taken, the appellant by giving a
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay,
unless such a stay is otherwise
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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prohibited by law or these rules.
The bond may be given at or after
the time of filing a notice of
appeal. The stay-is ef~ective
when a supersedeas bond is approved
by the court. (Emphasis added)

I

The trial court was powerless to enforce the visitation

I

order once the plaintiff had perfected his appeal and posted
supersedeas bond.

This was stated in Hidden-Meadows.Deveiop-

ment Company v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1248

(Utah~l979),

where this court said that "the purpose and effect of supersedeas is to restrain the successful party and the lower
court from taking affirmative action to enforce a judgment

_I

or decree."

.l_,

In the Minute Entry which approved. plaintiff's supersedeas bond, the court ruled that it would stay the portions
of its decree relating to the property settlement between
the parties, but that it would not stay the portion of the
order relating to visitation.

However, Rule 62(d) Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure states that "the stay is effec~ive
when the supersedeas~bond is approved by the court."
The trial court's authority was limited to the approval
or disapproval of the supersedeas bond.

No where was it

given the power to chose which portions of the decree will
be stayed on appeal.
B.

A Stay of Execution Pending.Appeal-Is-A Matter-of

Right In Custody Cases.

While this court has not yet ruled

on this point, it is the law in many jurisdictions that an
appeal in a custody case acts as an automatic stay of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

.

, __.

execution which deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to
enforce the order under appeal.

While there is no dispute

as to permanent custody in the present case, it is obvious
that the visitation order here is an award of temporary
custody and control over the children.

The same policy

considerations should control whether dealing with full
or part-time custody.
In Hunt v~ Superior Court, 21 Ariz.App.96,515 P.2d 1194,
1195 (1973), the court held that it was wrongful for a trial
court to refuse a stay pending appeal to a father appealing
an order which deprived him of custody of his children.

The

court stated:
In Allison v. Chatwin, 99 Ariz.99,407
P.2d 69 (1965), and a line of earlier
cases cited therein, our Supreme Court
held that when an appeal is filed in
a case in which custody of children is
changed by the lower court, it is
the duty of the court upon application to fix a supersedeas bond, the
purpose of which is to preserve the
status quo on the case pending appeal.
It is not within the power of-the lower
court to award custody of children temporarily pending appeal. The purpose
of the supersedeas bond is to afford
the party appealing from a lower court
order to stay any further proceedings
in the cause being appealed until such
time as the appeal has been ruled upon
by the reviewing court. Therefore, the
lower court, upon notice of appeal should
determine as quickly as possible the
amount of the supersedeas bond, stay
execution for a reasonable time to
permit the party appealing to post the
bond, and thereafter stay and preserve
the status quo.
In Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 676,242 P.2d 321,
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325 (1952), a mother sought to restrain the trial court from
allowing the removal of her child from the jurisdiction
while her custody appeal was pending.

The California

Supreme Court held that the lower court had no jurisdiction
to alter the status quo while the appeal was pending.

It

said:
A litigant in a custody action is entitled
to appellate review before his rights are
finally determined. If the appellant is
not protected from adverse action by the
trial court that would destroy the fruits
of his appeal, the right of appeal is
illusory. In contending that the trial
court can permit removal of the children
pending appeal, Clarence, [the father] in
effect, contends that the custody orders
should be immediately executed and not
stayed by appeal. The statutes and decisions of this state are opposed to this
contention, although some states have a
contrary rule.
The above rule was also applied in Appiication of
Frost, 134 Cal.App.2d 619,286 P.2d 378,379 (1955), a case
almost identical to the present one.

In Frost, the trial

court entered an order changing the custody of the parties'
child from the father to the mother.

The father was cited

for contempt when he refused to relinquish custody of the
child while the appeal was pending. The court of appeal
reversed the contempt conviction stating:
An appeal from an order modifying the
custody provisions of a divorce decree
suspends the power of the trial court
to enforce such order. The perfected
appeal automatically constitutes a
stay of proceedings and precludes the
trial court from interfering with custody as it existed at the time of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appeal.
In Re Barr, 39 Cal.2d 25,D43
P.2d 787.
For further support of this

rule~

the court should see

Murphy v. Murphy, 64 Nev.481,184 P.2d 1004 (1947); Prescott v.
Prescott, 97 Id.257,542 P.2d 1176 (1975); waikow-v. Walkow,
36 Wash.2d 510,219 P.2d 108 (1950); and Application of Orlando,
124 Cal.App.2d 594,269 P.2d 45 (1954).
This court has long recognized in other types of cases,
the importance of maintaining the status quo between the
parties during an appeal.

In Bullion,-Beck and Champion

Mining Company v. Eureka Hill Mining Company, 5 Utah 147,13
P.174, 175 (1887),this court held that the trial court was
powerless to enforce a mandatory injunction while an appeal
on that injunction was pending.

This court said:

The taking of the appeal and the giving
of the supersedeas bond did not make
void or nullify or suspend the judgment,
nor the injunction contained therein,
but all affirmative action looking to
the execution of the terms of the decree
were suspended. The district court during
the pendency of the appeal, could do no
act which d.id not look to the holding of
the subject of litigation just as it existed when the decree was rendered.
In the
exercise of its authority to preserve the
property, the district court was empowered
to punish as for contempt for the violation
of any provision of the injunction, where
the parties were not allowing the property
to remain as it was on the date of the decree.
If this were not so, the recovery
in the appellate court might often be a
barren victory.
In the case of Smith v. Kimball, 76 Utah 350,289 P.588,
589 (1930), the petitioner had been threatened with contempt
for refusing to obey a court order while it was being appealed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In granting a writ of prohibition which forbade the contempt
prosecution, this court said:
The judgment in the main action, from
which the appeal was taken and which
was superseded, was, in legal effect
by the appeal and supersedeas~ vacated
and rendered inoperative, the authority
of the court below terminated and prevented from further proceeding with respect to any matter involved in the
subject matter of the appeal,
take any action which amounted~n
execution or enforcement of the judg~
ment, or which effected the subject
matter of the appeal, and the case
left with all its incidences precisely
as it stood before the rendition of a
judgment in the court below. • • though
the judgment in the district court was
a final judgment for purposes of the
appeal, yet, because of the appeal and
the supersedeas, was not a final determination of the rights of the parties
in and to the subject matter of the
litigation, until a determination by
this court.

or-to

Maintaining the status quo in cases involving the
·custody or visitation of children is especially important.
An erroneous trial court judgment may result in irreparable
physical and emotional harm to the children i f i t is
enforced before it can be reversed on appeal.
The plaintiff in the present case, believes that the
trial court order allowing overnight visitation with the
defendant is erroneous and hazardous to the welfare of his
children.

This belief is based on substantial evidence that

the defendant mother is involved in homosexual affairs and
the abuse of illegal drugs, and that she freely associates
in her apartment with other persons of similar habits.
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The

plaintiff has a right to keep his children out of such an
environment until and unless there is a final determination
by this Court that such an environment will not be physically
or emotionally harmful to them.

To allow the trial court to

make this determination pending this appeal is to give the
lower court power which cannot be checked by the appellate
process.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S REASONABLE BELIEF IN HIS RIGHT
TO A STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL PRECLUDES HIS BEING CONVICTED OF CONTEMPT.
The plaintiff should not be found guilty of contempt
even if this Court finds that he had no right to a stay of
execution because any reasonable person in his position
would have acted in the same manner.

Plaintiff was ordered

to immediately comply with a decree which he reasonably felt
would be harmful to his children without. the opportunity of
having had that decree reviewed on appeal.

Since Utah has

long followed the policy of maintaining the status quo
pending appeal, and other jurisdictions explicitly hold that
execution in custody cases is stayed pending appeal, the
plaintiff was reasonable in believing that immediate
enforcement of the decree was beyond the jurisdiction of the
trial court and he was reasonable in refusing to subject his
children to the risk of harm pursuant to an invalid order.
Plaintiff's position is supported in the case of In Re
Thomas, 56 Utah 315, 190 P.952 (1920), where the attorneys
of a litigate were convicted of contempt for advising their
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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client to disobey a court order.

This court reversed the

convictions on the grounds that the advice had been based on
a reasonable view of the law at the time it was given even
though such view was not later adopted by this court.

This

court stated:
If, therefore, the appellants had.good
cause to believe, and in good faith did
believe, that the order in question was
in excess of the court's power or jurisdiction, or that it was improvidently
issued and for that reason vulnerable • • • it was their duty to assail
the order in a proper manner and at
the proper time, and to advise their
client to that effect. We have very
carefully read all of the evidence
and the proceedings in this case and,
after doing so, and without pausing
here to set forth the evidence, have
been forced to the conclusion that
what was said and done by counsel, in
view of all the circumstances, does not
constitute a criminal contempt. The ·
conviction is forced upon us that the
appellant Thomas, who was first called
upon for advice
in the best of faith
assumed that the order of the court
could be successfully assailed upon
several grounds. • • The question had
not been before the courts in this jurisdiction, and therefore had not been
decided. Moreover, there are some respectable authorities which support [the
advice given]. True, we have since held
the law to be otherwise in this jurisdiction. The question was, however, an
open one at the time the alleged contempt
was committed, and hence any lawyer would
have been justified in assailing such
an order. • • We are clearly of the opinion, therefore, that under all the circumstances appellants had a clear legal right
to assail the order in question, and therefore their conduct and that of the cashier
in refusing to comply with the order forthwith did not constitute contempt.
-11-
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POINT III
A CONVICTION OF CIVIL CONTEMPT FALLS IF THE
UNDERLYING ORDER IS REVERSED ON APPEAL.

While the validity of the violated order is irrelevant
in cases of criminal contempt, it is critical in cases of
civil contempt.

It is stated in 17 Am.Jur.2d 48, Contempt

§42 that:
Courts may distinguish between civil and
criminal contempts with respect to the
invalidity of the allegedly violated order.
Thus, it has been stated by a federal
court that in criminal contempt proceedings
based on the violation of a court order, the
validity of that order is not open to question in the slightest degree, and that disobedience constitutes a contempt, even ~hough
the oider is set aside on appeal or otherwise
becomes ineffective.
In contrast, a charge
of civil contempt is said to fall with the
violated order, if it is determined that the
order was erroneously or wrongfully issued.
This rule is confirmed in the case of United States
.. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330

u.s.

258,294,67

S.Ct.677,91 L.Ed.884 (1946), where the Court held that,
It does not follow, of course, that
simply because a defendant may be punished for criminal contempt for disobedience of an order later set aside
on appeal, that the plaintiff in the
action may profit by way of a fine
imposed in a simultaneous proceeding
for civil contempt based upon a violation of the same order. The right
to remedial relief falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued.
The rationale for this rule is that a conviction of
civil contempt is primarily intended to coerce a performance
for the benefit of one of the parties; while a conviction of
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criminal contempt is intended to defend the authority of the
court.

In Faircloth v. Faircloth, 321 So.2d 87 (Fla.App.

1975), the court stated that:
While there may be some elements of
punishment involved in a civil contempt,
the primary purpose is to secure compliance with the court's order for the
benefit of the opposing party. On the
other hand, as stated by the Supreme
Court in Demetree, supra, "a contempt
proceeding criminal in nature is instituted solely and simply to vindicate the authority of the court or
otherwise punish for conduct offensive
to the public in violation of an order
of the court."
A civil contempt order falls after the violated order
is reversed because the party intended to be benefited by it
is not entitled t_o relief after the underlying order is
invalidated.
It is clear that the present case involves a civil
contempt charge.

The order was issued at the request of

the defendant for the purpose of coercing the plaintiff
into allowing the defendant to have the children for overnight visitation.

In Faircloth, supra, the court said that:

It is obvious that a contempt commitment issued as the result of a party's
failure to comply with the requirements
of a final judgment of dissolution of
marriage is a civil contempt rather than
a criminal contempt (unless such failure
consists in doing a forbidden act injurious to the opposite party in which event
it may be a criminal contempt).
This court must, therefore, consider the validity of
the visitation order appealed from in case number 16481
before deciding the present appeal because a valid initial
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

court order is a prerequisite to a valid civil contempt
conviction.
POINT IV
A CONVICTION FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT
MAY BE RENDERED ONLY AFTER A FULL
EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND ONLY BY THE
JUDGE WHO PRESIDED OVER THAT HEARING.
The procedure under which the contempt conviction was
rendered was clearly improper.

A person accused of indirect

contempt is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under U.C.A.
§78-32-9 which states:
When the person arrested has been brought
up or has appeared the court or judge must
proceed to investigate the charge, and must
hear any answer which the person arrested
may make to the same, and may examine witnesses for or against him: for which an adjournment may be had from time to time, if
necessary.
It should be obvious that such a hearing must be before
the judge who must rule on the order.

This is implicit in

the language of §78-32-9 which states that "the court or
judge must proceed to investigate the charge": and is the
only procedure consistant with due process and common sense.
To separate the hearing of evidence from the judge who must
decide the case is to put the latter judge. in the dark.
Without the opportunity to hear all of the evidence and
observe the witnesses, his decision cannot be an informed
one.

It would be completely dependent on the propriety of

the first judge's findings of fact.

Such a procedure

subverts the policy of having decisions made by an independent, well-informed judiciary and compels some judges to
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act as rubber-stamps for decisions effectively made by
other judges.
Such a procedure is directly contrary to Rule 63(a)
U.R.C.P. which governs the powers of a succeeding judge in a
case where the original judge is unable to continue.

Rule

63(a) states:
If by reason of death, sickness or other
disability, a judge before whom an action
has been tried is unable to perform the
duties to be performed by the court under
these Rules after-a-verdict is returned or
findings-of-fact and conclusions of law are
filed, then any other judge regularly sitting
in or assigned to the court in which the action
was tried may perform those duties; but if
such other judge is satisfied that he cannot
perform those duties because he did not
preside at the trial or for any other.reason,
he may in his discretion grant a new trial.
(Emphasis added)
The procedure in the present case is clearly in violation
of this rule.

First, Judge Sorensen was not sick or disabled

in any way contemplated by the statute.

Second, the case

was transferred to Judge Ballif after the evidence was
presented and findings of fact were made, but before a
verdict or conclusions of law were reached.

Indeed, the

case was transferred so that Judge Ballif could find the
conclusions of law and reach a verdict.

The Rule explicitly

requires a verdict or findings of fact and conclusions of
law be made before another judge can be substituted.
Other jurisdictions are in accord with this interpretation of Rule 63.

In Appiication of Pioneer Mill Company, 53

Haw. 573,497 P.2d 549,555 fn.5 (1972) the court said:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

The normal rule, of course, is that only
the judge who conducted the trial may enter a de.cision in a case. Atlas Financial
Corp. v. Oliver; Vt.; 274 A.2d 687 (1971~
Cram v. Bach, l Wis.2d 378, 83 N.W.
2d 877, 85 N.W.2d 673 (1957). Rule
63 of the Haw.Rules of Civ.Pro., • • •
enables one judge to perform duties in
a case after a disabled judge has returned a verdict or filed findings of
fact and conclusions of law. The rule
seeks to allow the successor judge to
complete the formal acts necessary to
conclude the litigations, such as entering formal judgment, issuing injunctions,
awarding costs; and hearing post trial
motions. However; the rule can only be
invoked where a complete and final decision has been rendered by the disabled
judge. The danger that one judge might
misinterpret a prior judge's informal
notes or oral statements, or err in attempting to judge the credibility of witnesses
. from a transcript is thought to be sufficiently great that the judicial system
should be put to the inconvenience of conducting a new trial. Bromberg v. Moul,
275 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1960).
There have been numerous cases in which a substitute
judge has been allowed to perform various post verdict
duties after the disability of the initial judge.

As noted

above, however, in each case; these duties pertained only to
formal and routine procedures done after the decision in the
case.

In State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (Utah, 1975), for

example, this Court allowed a substitute judge to sign
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law, but only
after the trial judge had reached a verdict and made his own
findings and conclusions.

There are no cases which appellant

has found which allow the actual decision in a case to be
made by a judge who did not hear the evidence.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

Judge Sorensen transferred this case pursuant to case
authority which he felt prevented him from hearing a case
involving contempt against his own court.
16619)

(R.43, Case No.

Whether or not he was required to make this transfer

is irrelevant.

It was improper either way.

to transfer the

action~

action.

If he was bound

he was bound to transfer the entire

He could not transfer just the decision making

functions while hearing the evidence himself.

Such a

division would defeat any purpose behind the rule requiring
the transfer in the first place.

The contemnor would still·

be subject to possible prejudice from the judge he contemned.
If the judge was not required under the law to· transfer the
action then he was not legally disabled under Rule 63(a)
U.R.C.P., and the substituting judge had no power to act in·
the case.
The procedure resorted to here, while done for the best
of motives, was clearly improper.

The appellant

~ost

most

of the benefit of the hearing required by U.C.A. 78-32-9
because the deciding judge was not present at such

hearing~

Judge Ballif was unable to consider any explanations or
mitigating facts offered by the plaintiff because his
decision was based solely on the findings of fact made by
Judge Sorensen (R.9,Case No. 16619)

The plaintiff was thus

effectively deprived of his right to a hearing and his
conviction must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court clearly exceeded its authority in
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.J

convicting the appellant of contempt.

Not only was its

procedure totally improper but appellant was entitled to a
stay of execution during the pendancy of his appeal under
the long standing decisions of this court and because he had
met the statutory requirements for a stay under Rule 62(d)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Further, appellant's

disobedience of the court's order was based on a reasonable
and good faith belief in its invalidity.

Such reasonable

action, even if it later is decided to be incorrect, cannot
be the basis of a contempt conviction.
Finally, this Court must consider the validity of the
initial visitation order in conjunction with this appeal.
The conviction of contempt cannot stand if that order is
reversed.

To do otherwise would allow a father to be

punished for acts this Court may later decide to be in the
best interests of the children involved.
Respectfully submitted this /.i~day of December, 1979.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
MAILED two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief to Mr.
William

w.

Downes, Jr., 214 East 500 South, Salt Lake City,

Utah, 84111, this /elf/; day of December, 1979.
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